Brent Poll v. Board of Adjustment for the City of South Weber : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2006
Brent Poll v. Board of Adjustment for the City of
South Weber : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Brent Poll; Pro Se Appellant.
Christopher F. Allred; Attorney for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Poll v. Board of Adjustments, No. 20061012 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6946
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRENT POLL, : 
Petitioner/Appellant : Case No. 20061012-CA 
vs. 
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT for 
the City of South Weber, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM GRANT OF APPELLEE'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR 
LACK OF JURISDICTION IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
DAVIS COUNTY, THE HONORABLE JON M. MEMMOTT 
BRENT POLL CHRISTOPHER F. ALLRED (7801) 
7605 South 1375 East 1634 Navajo Drive 
South Weber City, Utah 84405 Ogden, Utah 84403 
PRO SE APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE 
"TAHAPPELUTEGOUmc 
MAY3I2007 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
ISSUES PRESERVED IN TRIAL COURT 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 5 
ARGUMENT 6 
I. JURISDICTION MAY BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME AT THE DISTRICT 
COURT 6 
II. THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT'S AUTHORITY TO HEAR AND DECIDE 
APPEALS IS LIMITED TO APPEALS EMANATING FROM AN 
AFFIRMATIVE ORDER, REQUIREMENT, DECISION OR 
DETERMINATION IN WHICH A LAND USE AUTHORITY HAS APPLIED A 
LAND USE ORDINANCE TO A PARTICULAR APPLICATION, PERSON, 
ORPARCEL 7 
III. THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT DOES NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO 
PROVIDE MANDAMUS-TYPE RELIEF BY COMPELLING THE CITY TO 
ENFORCE ITS ORDINANCES 12 
IV. NONE OF THE INDIVIDUAL ISSUES RAISED BY MR. POLL ARE 
APPEALS EMANATING FROM AN AFFIRMATIVE ORDER, 
REQUIREMENT, DECISION OR DETERMINATION IN WHICH A LAND 
USE AUTHORITY HAS APPLIED A LAND USE ORDINANCE TO A 
PARTICULAR APPLICATION, PERSON, OR PARCEL 15 
CONCLUSION 22 
ADDENDUM (statutes/ordinances whose interpretation is of central importance to this appeal) 
l 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATE CASES 
Ameritemps. Inc. v. Labor Com'n. 128 P.3d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) 6, 7 
Busche v. Salt Lake County. 26 P.3d 862, 867 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) 9,20 
Christensen v. Munns. 812 P.2d 69, 73 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 1 
Foutz v. City of South Jordan. 100 P.3d 1171 (Utah 2004) 1,10,11 
Houghton v. Dep't of Health. 125 P.3d 860. 868 (Utah 2005) 19 
Summit Water Distrib. Co. v. Summit County. 123 P.3d 437, 452 (Utah 2005) 19 
Toone v. Weber County. 57 P.3d 1079, 1082 (Utah 2002) 10 
STATE STATUTES, RULES AND LOCAL ORDINANCES 
Utah Code Ann. §10-9a-103(2) 8 
Utah Code Ann. §10-9a-103(13) 8 
Utah Code Ann. §10-9a-103(14) 9 
Utah Code Ann. §10-9a-701(l)(b) 8 
Utah Code Ann. §10-9a-701(2) 8,16,17 
Utah Code Ann. §10-9a-703 8, 17 
Utah Code Ann. §10-9a-707(4) 5, 8 
Utah Code Ann. §10-9a-801(l) 11 
Utah Code Ann. §10-9a-802 11 
UtahR. Civ. Pro. 65B 14 
Former Utah Code Ann. §10-9-704 9,19,20 
South Weber City Ordinance 10-4-4 9,13, 14 
ii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code §78-2a-3(2)(b)(i) and/or 0). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Whether jurisdiction may be raised for the first time at the district court. 
II. Whether the board of adjustment's authority to hear and decide appeals is limited to 
appeals emanating from an affirmative order, requirement, decision or determination in 
which a land use authority has applied a land use ordinance to a particular application, 
person, or parcel. 
III. Whether the Board of Adjustment has authority to compel the City to enforce its 
ordinances when a city resident alleges a failure on the part of the city to do so. 
IV. Whether the individual issues raised by Mr. Poll are appeals emanating from an 
affirmative order, requirement, decision or determination in which a land use authority 
has applied a land use ordinance to a particular application, person, or parcel. 
The first three issues present questions of law which are reviewed for correctness, giving 
no deference to the decision of the district court. See e.g., Foutz v. City of South Jordan, 100 
P.3d 1171 (Utah 2004). The fourth issue appears to be primarily a question of fact. Findings of 
fact are reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" standard of review. Under this standard of review, 
the appellant is required to marshal the evidence which supports the finding and then 
demonstrate that, despite this evidence, the finding is clearly erroneous. Christensen v. Munns, 
812 P.2d 69, 73 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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ISSUES PRESERVED IN TRIAL COURT 
The trial courts findings of fact and conclusions of law (Record at 405 - 410) and the 
transcript of the oral argument on the Board's motion to dismiss (Record at 428) demonstrate 
that the issues recited above were preserved at trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is the result of several issues raised by the appellant, Mr. Poll, to the South 
Weber City Board of Adjustment. The board of adjustment provided responses unfavorable to 
Mr. Poll, and he appealed those decisions to the district court. The district court held that the 
board of adjustment did not have jurisdiction to resolve Mr. Poll's issues in the first place and, 
therefore, the district court was without jurisdiction to review the Board's determinations. The 
case was dismissed on the Board's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On two separate occasions Mr. Poll submitted lists of complaints and issues 
concerning South Weber City to the Board of Adjustment for South Weber City (hereinafter the 
Board). Poll characterized the lists as "appeals" to the Board (Record at 406). 
2. The first set of issues submitted by Poll are as follows: 
A. Subdivision plat issues. Poll states in his petition that he "challenged the 
Mayor's failure to require the subdivider to either stay within the drawn-to-scale 
boundaries of the approved p la t . . . or to require the subdivider to vacate the approved 
plat and create a new one.. ." (Record at 4 and 406). 
B. Vinyl Fence. This issue involves an appeal of a decision made by the city 
council not to require a chain link fence under Section 11-4-13 of the City's subdivision 
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ordinance (Record at 7-9, 169 and 406). 
C. Construction of the road. This appears to be a dispute about whether a 
road was created during the construction of a subdivision in the City (Record at 9-11, 170 
and 406). 
D. Easements on 1375 East. Mr. Poll apparently alleges that the mayor, city 
manager, and city attorney improperly offered opinions concerning the necessity of 
obtaining easements on 1375 East (Record at 11-15 and 406). 
3 The second set of issues submitted by Poll are as follows: 
A. Sewer placement trespass issue. "Failure to apply/enforce 10-3-2 in basic 
trespass issue relating to recent sewer placement onto Lester from the Byram Subdivision. 
Described in greater detail in 2 Apr 2005 letter to the Board." (Record at 24-25 and 406-
407). 
B. Fire hydrant issue. "[f]ailure to apply/enforce ordinance 10-3-2, 10-3-9, 
and 10-14-10 described in greater detail in 31 Mar 2005 letter to the Board. Matter 
involves placement of a fire hydrant at the end of 1375 East without the requisite support 
facilities." (Record at 26-27 and 407). 
C. Interpretation and application of the city's sensitive land ordinance. 
"Interpretation of Sensitive Land Ordinance (Title 10, Chapter 14), violation of it by the 
developer of the Highland Estates Subdivision (slope destruction), and the unresolved 
dispute concerning it between the City and the Davis and Weber Counties Canal 
Company. Particular emphasis on the Company's insistence that destruction has occurred 
and that an independent third-party-expert opinion is still required to address this 
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violation. This is cited in limited form in the 31 Mar 05 letter to the Board (item 1 B)." 
(Record at 28-29 and 407). 
4. The issues raised by Poll primarily involve alleged wrongful failures on the part of 
the City to apply or enforce various ordinances. In several instances, by way of remedy, Poll 
requests that the Board force the City to enforce the ordinances that Poll alleges were not being 
enforced. 
5. The first list of issues was submitted prior to May 2, 2005, the date on which a 
number of amendments to the Municipal Land Use, Development, and Management Act 
(hereinafter the Act) became effective. The second list was submitted after May 2, 2005. 
6. The Board heard and decided the issues in open and public meetings and found 
that the City had not wrongfully failed to enforce or apply its ordinances, except as pertaining to 
the requirement that a developer install a vinyl fence rather than a chain link fence. 
7. Mr. Poll was dissatisfied with the decisions of the Board and appealed them to the 
district court. Poll filed two separate appeals: one was assigned to Judge Memmott, case 
#050700359, and the other to Judge Page, case #050700250. Based on Poll's motion, these cases 
were consolidated under case #050700359. 
8. The Board, having subsequently determined that it lacked the authority to resolve 
the issues raised by Poll, moved the district court to dismiss Poll's appeals for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
9. The district court, Judge Jon M. Memmott, held that each of the items raised by 
Mr. Poll were outside of the limited jurisdiction of the Board. Therefore, the court dismissed Mr. 
Poll's petitions for review based on the Board's lack of jurisdiction (Record at 410). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The point of the arguments made in this brief is not to deprive Mr. Poll of any lawful 
remedies that may be available. However, the board of adjustment is simply not the correct 
venue to resolve his complaints. The Board does not have jurisdiction to resolve the issues 
raised or to provide the remedies requested. 
Issue I. The issue of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, including for 
the first time at the district court, because such issues determine whether a court has authority to 
address the merits of a particular case. When reviewing a board of adjustment decision, it would 
not make sense for a district court to review the merits of a case over which the Board did not 
have jurisdiction to begin with. 
Issue II. Mr. Poll has submitted a number of issues to the Board. The complaints or 
grievances submitted involve alleged failures on the part of the city to enforce its ordinances. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §10-9a-707(4), "Only those decisions in which a land use authority 
has applied a land use ordinance to a particular application, person, or parcel may be appealed to 
an appeal authority." None of the issues raised involves a "decision" in which a land use 
authority has applied a land use ordinance to a particular application, person, or parcel. 
Therefore, the Board (and consequently the district court) had no jurisdiction over the subject 
matter of the issues Poll raised. 
Issue III. Alleging that the mayor and other city officials and agencies have failed to 
comply with or enforce city ordinances, Poll seeks to have the Board compel them to enforce the 
ordinances he feels are going unenforced. Assuming Mr. Poll had grounds, the proper remedy 
for these types of claims would be injunction, mandamus, abatement, or other appropriate 
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remedies. The Board, however, has no authority to resolve these types of issues or to provide the 
requested relief, and the Board should not be used as a means to circumvent the formal 
requirements associated with pursuing the remedies already provided. 
Issue IV. An analysis of each of the individual issues raised by Mr. Poll shows that none 
of them are issues over which the Board has jurisdiction. 
ARGUMENT 
I. JURISDICTION MAY BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME AT THE DISTRICT 
COURT 
The district court correctly determined that jurisdiction may be raised at any time (Record 
at 408). The court determined that even though the Board may have initially failed to recognize 
that it lacked the authority to resolve the issues raised by Mr. Poll when those issues were 
presented to the Board, the Board may nevertheless argue that the Board, and consequently the 
district court, did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the issues Poll raised. The court relied 
on Ameritemps, Inc. v. Labor Com'n, 128 P.3d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) in reaching this 
conclusion. In Ameritemps, the Utah Court of Appeals elaborated on the fact that subject matter 
jurisdiction can be raised at any time: 
"'Questions regarding subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at 
any time because such issues determine whether a court has 
authority to address the merits of a particular case.'" Housing 
Auth. v. Snyder, 2002 UT 28,111, 44 P.3d 724. In addition, 
because subject matter jurisdiction is a prerequisite to this court's 
power to consider the substantive issues, the requirement that the 
court have proper jurisdiction over the subject of the dispute 
cannot be waived. See, e.g., Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f34, 
100 P.3d 1177; Barnard v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243, 248 (Utah 
1993). Issues relating to subject matter jurisdiction are threshold 
questions that should be addressed before resolving other claims. 
See Snyder, 2002 UT 28 at 1fl 1, 44 P.3d 724. Because we conclude 
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that Petitioners' challenge to subject matter jurisdiction is properly 
before us, we consider it before addressing their challenge to the 
Board's substantive decision." 
Ameritemps, Inc. v. Labor Com'n, at 35-36. 
Mr. Poll appears to be arguing either that the Board has discretion to determine for itself 
the matters over which it will assume jurisdiction (see e.g. Record at 428, transcript of oral 
argument p. 32, lines 18 and 19), or that because the Board thought it had jurisdiction when it 
originally responded to his complaints, the Board has waived any right to argue that it now 
recognizes that it did not have jurisdiction over the subject of the dispute (Brief of Appellant at 
13-14). However, according to Mr. Poll's logic, the Board could resolve all kinds of issues for 
which it had no authority so long as it originally believed it did have authority. For example, if 
the Board was requested to resolve a search and seizure issue, or to pass upon the guilt or 
innocence of a person charged with a crime, so long as the Board "thought" it had jurisdiction to 
resolve those issues at the time, the issue of jurisdiction could not be challenged later. This of 
course would be incorrect. The district court correctly pointed out that just because the Board 
may have thought they had jurisdiction does not mean that they actually had jurisdiction (Record 
at 35-36). Moreover, as explained in Ameritemps, Inc., the requirement for proper jurisdiction 
over the subject of the dispute cannot be waived. 
II. THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT'S AUTHORITY TO HEAR AND 
DECIDE APPEALS IS LIMITED TO APPEALS EMANATING FROM AN 
AFFIRMATIVE ORDER, REQUIREMENT, DECISION OR 
DETERMINATION IN WHICH A LAND USE AUTHORITY HAS 
APPLIED A LAND USE ORDINANCE TO A PARTICULAR 
APPLICATION, PERSON, OR PARCEL 
A. The nature of Mr. Poll's complaints/grievances. In this case, Mr. Poll brought 
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numerous complaints and grievances, characterized as "appeals", before the South Weber City 
Board of Adjustment. The issues raised by Poll primarily involve allegations that the City failed 
to take various courses of action that Poll feels were required under city ordinances. In Mr. 
Poll's letter to the Board of Adjustment dated 24 Feb 2005, he specifically states: "This is an 
appeal of failures to enforce several zoning provisions within our City ordinances. Our 
commissioners and council members have been made well aware of them through various forums 
(including a training session provided by the league of cities and towns), but have not exercised 
the power and authority inherent to their offices to affect compliance. Our Mayor . . . has 
primary responsibility in our City for enforcing our ordinances but has failed to do so . . . " 
(Record at 168). The district court found that none of the issues raised by Poll were properly 
before the Board because the Board did not have jurisdiction to resolve them. 
B. Subject matter jurisdiction of the board of adjustment. Appeal authorities 
such as the board of adjustment have no inherent authority; they have only the very limited 
authority granted by state statute or local ordinance. Utah Code Ann. §10-9a-707(4) states "Only 
those decisions in which a land use authority has applied a land use ordinance to a 
particular application, person, or parcel may be appealed to an appeal authority." (Emphasis 
added) Utah Code Sections 10-9a-701(l)(b), 10-9a-701(2), and 10-9a-703 each reinforce the 
need for an official "decision" made by a "land use authority" applying a "land use ordinance" to 
a specific "application, person, or parcel."1 
1
 The following definitions found at U.C.A. §10-9a-103 are helpful: 
(2) "Appeal authority" means the person, board, commission, agency, or other body designated 
by ordinance to decide an appeal of a decision of a land use application or a variance. 
(13) "Land use application" means an application required by a municipality's land use 
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This is entirely consistent with the way the Utah Court of Appeals has interpreted former 
U.C.A. §10-9-704, which addressed appeals to the board of adjustment by persons adversely 
affected by a decision administering or interpreting a zoning ordinance.2 In Busche v. Salt Lake 
County, 26 P.3d 862, 867 (Utah Ct App. 2001), the Utah Court of Appeals identified four 
specific elements necessary for a proper claim under U.C.A. §17-27-704 (this section applied 
specifically to county boards of adjustment, but the language is identical to §10-9-704). The 
elements of a proper appeal include: "(1) a person adversely affected, (2) a decision 
administering or interpreting a zoning ordinance, (3) a decision applying the zoning ordinance, 
and (4) an error in the decision administering or interpreting the zoning ordinance." 
The authority granted to the Board under South Weber City Ordinance 10-4-4 also limits 
its review to appeals from a specific order, requirement, decision or determination made an 
administrative official in the enforcement of the planning or zoning provisions of the City 
ordinances. 
Typical situations where a land use authority applies a land use ordinance to a particular 
application, person, or parcel include applications for conditional use permits, zoning changes, 
building permits, certificates of occupancy and so forth. In each of these instances a land use 
ordinance. 
(14) "Land use authority" means a person, board, commission, agency, or other body designated 
by the local legislative body to act upon a land use application. 
2
 Former Section 10-9-704(l)(a)(i): "The applicant or any other person or entity 
adversely affected by a decision administering or interpreting a zoning ordinance may appeal that 
decision applying the zoning ordinance by alleging that there is error in any order, requirement, 
decision, or determination made by an official in the administration or interpretation of the 
zoning ordinance." 
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authority is required to make a formal decision based on the required land use application. Only 
after such a decision is rendered, and a person is adversely affected by that decision, is there an 
issue that is ripe and appropriate for appeal to the board of adjustment. 
C. The distinction between affirmative "decisions" and alleged failures to act. A 
review of the issues/grievances raised by Mr. Poll demonstrates that they are not decisions in 
which a land use authority has applied a land use ordinance to a particular application, person, 
or parcel. Nor are they appeals from a specific order, requirement, decision or determination 
made by the administrative official in the enforcement of a planning or zoning provision. 
Primarily Poll complains about alleged violations of ordinances and/or failures to act 
rather than responding to an affirmative "order, requirement, decision or determination." As 
previously discussed, there must be some official action from which to appeal. Standing alone, 
violations or failures to act cannot correctly be considered "orders, requirements, decisions or 
determinations" from which an appeal may be taken. In Toone v. Weber County, 57 P.3d 1079, 
1082 (Utah 2002), the Utah Supreme Court distinguished between formal "decisions" and 
alleged violations or failures to act under the County Land Use Development and Management 
Act: "Standing alone, violations of CLUDMA cannot correctly be considered 'decisions' by the 
county, unless the county, through official action, decided to disregard the Act. . ." The court 
also held the following: "Nor, as noted above, can the alleged failure to comply with the 
procedural requirements of CLUDMA be considered a land use decision." Alleged failures to 
comply with procedural requirements are at the heart of Mr. Poll's complaints. 
Whether an allegation arises in response to a formal land use decision as opposed to a 
claim alleging a failure to act is critical in determining what remedies may be available. For 
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instance, in Foutz v. City of South Jordan, 100 P.3d 1171 (Utah 2004) the Utah Supreme Court 
reviewed the district court's interpretation and application of former Sections 10-9-1001 and 10-
9-1002 of the Utah Code. Section 10-9-1001, the appeals section, provided the procedure for 
parties seeking to challenge municipal land use decisions and required them to exhaust 
administrative remedies. In contrast, Section 10-9-1002, the enforcement section, authorized 
parties to initiate actions to enforce municipal land use ordinances without reference to any 
exhaustion requirement. After reading and analyzing the provisions in conjunction one with 
another, "attempting to give effect to and harmonize their collective provisions" the court 
reached the following conclusion: 
Consistent with these principles, the Enforcement section is 
available to parties seeking redress from an alleged ordinance 
violation in circumstances where the alleged violation is not 
authorized by or embodied in a municipal land use decision. When 
the alleged violation arises directly from a municipal land use 
decision, the parties must comply with the requirements of the 
statutory provision that specifically addresses appeals from land 
use decisions, section 10-9-1001. The court reviewing the appeal 
may then determine whether the land use decision was "arbitrary, 
capricious,1' or, as in the case of violated ordinances, "illegal." 
Foutz v. City of South Jordan. 100 P.3d at 1175. 
Currently, the "appeals section" is found at U.C.A. §10-9a-801, and the "enforcement 
section" is at U.C.A. §10-9a-802. Section 10-9a-801(l) directs a person to exhaust his 
administrative remedies with the "appeal authority" (the board of adjustment) when challenging a 
municipality's "land use decision." On the other hand, Section 10-9a-802 lists the types of 
remedies available where someone is alleging an ordinance violation in circumstances where the 
alleged violation is not authorized by or embodied in a municipal land use decision. Under these 
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circumstances, as stated in 10-9a-802, the appropriate remedy would be injunction, mandamus, 
abatement, or other appropriate remedies. The board of adjustment, however, is not the 
appropriate venue to address these issues, and it has no authority to provide these types of 
remedies. 
Because the Board only has jurisdiction to hear appeals from affirmative land use 
decisions (such as those made in response to specific applications for zoning changes, 
conditional use permits, building permits, certificates of occupancy and so forth) the district court 
correctly concluded that Poll's allegations of ordinance violations or failures to act are not issues 
which the Board has authority to resolve. Rather, the court pointed out, Poll's recourse, if any, 
would most likely be to pursue a writ of mandamus or the political process. (Record at 428, 
transcript of oral argument pp. 33-34) This conclusion is consistent with the Utah Supreme 
Court's analysis in Foutz v. City of South Jordan. 
III. THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT DOES NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO 
PROVIDE MANDAMUS-TYPE RELIEF BY COMPELLING THE CITY 
TO ENFORCE ITS ORDINANCES 
In his brief, Mr. Poll spends considerable effort alleging that the mayor and other city 
officials and agencies have failed to comply with or enforce city ordinances (Brief of Appellant 
at 10-12). Likewise, in his letter to the Board 24 Feb 2005, where he characterizes his action 
before the Board as "an appeal of failures to enforce several zoning provisions within our City 
ordinances," specifically alleging that these failures were on the part of "commissioners," 
"council members," and "the mayor" (Record at 168). As the district court explained, the 
remedy for these types of complaints, if any, would most likely be mandamus or the political 
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process (Record at 428, transcript of oral argument pp. 33-34). These are remedies the Board has 
no authority to provide. 
Mr. Poll relies primarily on South Weber City Ordinance 10-4-4(A) as the authority for 
his position that the Board has the power to compel the mayor and other city officials to comply 
with or enforce city ordinances. That section reads as follows: 
The Board of Adjustments shall have the following powers: 
A. Appeals: To hear and decide appeals where it is alleged 
that there is error in any order, requirement, decision or 
determination made by the administrative official and [sic] the 
enforcement of any of the planning or zoning provisions of the City 
ordinances. (Emphasis added) 
Although not entirely clear from Mr. Poll's various arguments, it appears that his position 
is that this section essentially grants the Board two very distinct types of powers: (1) the power to 
"hear and decide appeals where it is alleged that there is error in any order, requirement, decision 
or determination made by the administrative official" and (2) "the enforcement of any of the 
planning or zoning provisions of the City ordinances." However, this interpretation is 
inconsistent with both the intent of the ordinance and the authority of board's of adjustment 
generally. Consistent with the statutory authority granted board's of adjustment, or "appeal 
authorities," this section is only intended to provide authority for the Board to hear and decide a 
narrow class of appeals: those where an error is alleged to have been made in the enforcement of 
planning or zoning provisions of the city ordinances. 
The way Mr. Poll reads it, the Board would be vested with broad authority under the first 
part to hear and decide appeals from any decisions made by an administrative official regardless 
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of whether the decision had anything to do with planning or zoning. Under the second part, as 
Poll sees it, the Board would be provided broad authority to "enforce" planning and zoning 
provisions. Based on his interpretation that this second part of the section provides authority for 
the Board to enforce planning and zoning provisions, Poll makes an unprecedented leap to the 
conclusion that the Board has authority to compel the city to enforce ordinances which he 
subjectively feels are going unenforced. In other words, Poll is arguing that a non law-trained 
board of adjustment has authority to issue mandamus-type remedies. 
As pointed out in Black's Law Dictionary, even for a formal court of law "[t]he remedy 
of mandamus is a drastic one, to be invoked only in extraordinary situations." Black's Law 
Dictionary, 495 (5th ed. 1983). Further, the process to pursue mandamus, or "extraordinary 
relief," is governed under Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This section sets forth 
the grounds on which extraordinary relief is available, it provides standards of review, and it 
requires compliance with all relevant Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. If the legislative body of 
the city truly intended to provide mandamus-type oversight to the Board, it would not make sense 
for them to simply allude to this extraordinary power in one vague line buried under the 
"appeals" section. Nor would it make sense to impute this intent to the city council when (1) a 
procedure to pursue the remedy is already available under Rule 65B and (2) there is no statutory 
authority for the city to provide this type of power to a board of adjustment. 
One of the problems with interpreting 10-4-4(A) is that there appears to be a 
typographical or clerical error. Out of context, it would make a certain amount of sense to read 
10-4-4(A) as setting out two separate and distinct powers because the two parts are connected by 
the word "and" instead of "in." When the word "in" is used in place of "and", 10-4-4(A) makes 
14 
sense and is entirely consistent with statutory authority granted board's of adjustment. Read this 
way, this section, specifically captioned "Appeals," establishes the proper authority, consistent 
with U.C.A. §10-9a-701 et seq., for the Board to hear and decide appeals where an error is 
alleged to have been made "in" the enforcement of planning or zoning provisions of the city 
ordinances. 
Finally, the district court correctly argued that even if the city council had unequivocally 
drafted an ordinance purporting to give that power to the Board, such an ordinance would be 
invalid because the city would not have had the authority to empower the Board beyond those 
powers specifically enumerated for boards of adjustment in state statute (Record at 428, 
transcript of oral argument pp. 37-41). 
In short, if Poll has grounds to pursue a mandamus action as he appears to be claiming, 
then he should be required to pursue that extraordinary remedy properly in the district court. The 
argument that the Board has no jurisdiction to resolve Poll's issues is not an attempt to deprive 
him of any lawful remedy he might have. But the Board is simply not the proper venue to 
address the issues he has raised. 
IV. NONE OF THE INDIVIDUAL ISSUES RAISED BY MR. POLL ARE 
APPEALS EMANATING FROM AN AFFIRMATIVE ORDER, 
REQUIREMENT, DECISION OR DETERMINATION IN WHICH A 
LAND USE AUTHORITY HAS APPLIED A LAND USE ORDINANCE TO 
A PARTICULAR APPLICATION, PERSON, OR PARCEL 
A. Discussion of individual issues appealed to the district court under original case 
number 050700359. This brief will first address the issues raised in Poll's petition for review 
originally filed under case number 050700359. 
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1. Sewer placement trespass issue. Mr. Poll's appeal to the Board was stated as 
follows: "Failure to apply/enforce 10-3-2 in basic trespass issue relating to recent sewer 
placement onto Lester from the Byram Subdivision. Described in greater detail in 2 Apr 2005 
letter to the Board." The only action required under South Weber Code §10-3-2 is that certain 
matters be submitted to the planning commission "for consideration and recommendation before 
action is taken thereon by the City Council or other City official." Again, however, alleged 
failures to comply with procedural requirements or violations of ordinances are not properly 
considered affirmative "decisions" from which an appeal to the Board may be taken, nor does the 
Board have authority to compel the city to enforce its ordinances. 
Utah Code Ann. §10-9a-701(2) also requires an adversely affected person to timely and 
"specifically" challenge a land use authority's decision. One of the chief problems in responding 
to Mr. Poll's appeals is lack of specificity. For instance, on this issue Mr. Poll's appeal does not 
specify who failed to "apply/enforce 10-3-2, " or in what way there was a failure in application or 
enforcement. At any rate, it appears that Poll is complaining primarily about an alleged trespass 
that has taken place in connection with the placement of the sewer. Whether Mr. Poll has a cause 
of action based on the placement of the sewer is not an issue for the Board to determine. This 
type of claim should be subject to formal rules of procedure, evidence, and discovery. The Board 
simply is not the correct forum to resolve these types of issues, and Poll should not be permitted 
to use the Board as a means to circumvent the formal requirements associated with bringing 
appropriate causes of action if he has grounds. 
The district court noted that Poll was essentially asking the Board to determine whether a 
trespass had occurred, and correctly concluded that "the Board had no authority or duty to resolve 
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this issue because it involves an alleged failure to apply or enforce a city ordinance rather than an 
appeal from an affirmative decision applying a land use ordinance." (Record at 409). 
1. Fire hydrant issue. Poll alleges that there was "failure to apply/enforce ordinance 
10-3-2, 10-3-9, and 10-14-10 described in greater detail in 31 Mar 2005 letter to the Board. 
Matter involves placement of a fire hydrant at the end of 1375 East without the requisite support 
facilities." (In \ 4 on page 6 of Poll's Petition he indicates that §10-3-9 was not referenced in his 
appeal to the Board, and that it is not at issue here.) These allegations involve alleged failures to 
comply with procedural requirements or violations of ordinances. Because this is not a situation 
involving a specific decision in which a land use authority has applied a land use ordinance, there 
is nothing ripe for an appeal to the Board. As with the previous issue, the district court correctly 
concluded that "[t]he fire hydrant issue is likewise beyond the Board's authority to resolve 
because it involves an alleged failure to apply or enforce a city ordinance rather than an appeal 
from an affirmative decision applying a land use ordinance." (Record at 410). 
3. Interpretation and application of the city's sensitive land ordinance. As previously 
argued in this brief, U.C.A. §10-9a-701(2) requires an adversely affected person to "specifically" 
challenge a land use authority's "decision." Section 10-9a-703 elaborates on the process, stating 
that a "person adversely affected by the land use authority's decision administering or 
interpreting a land use ordinance may . . . appeal that decision to the appeal authority by alleging 
that there is error in any order, requirement, decision, or determination made by the land use 
authority in the administration or interpretation of the land use ordinance." In Mr. Poll's appeal 
to the Board, he requested: 
17 
Interpretation of Sensitive Land Ordinance (Title 10, Chapter 14), 
violation of it by the developer of the Highland Estates Subdivision 
(slope destruction), and the unresolved dispute concerning it 
between the City and the Davis and Weber Counties Canal 
Company. Particular emphasis on the Company's insistence that 
destruction has occurred and that an independent third-party-expert 
opinion is still required to address this violation. This is cited in 
limited form in the 31 Mar 05 letter to the Board (item 1 B). 
(Record at 28-29 and 407). 
Initially this broad request lacks sufficient specificity and clarity for the Board to know 
exactly what is expected by way of a response. Further, a general request to the Board to provide 
an "interpretation of the Sensitive Land Ordinance" is, by itself, meaningless. The code permits 
an appeal to the Board when a person has been adversely affected by a land use authority's 
decision "administering or interpreting" a land use ordinance. Poll fails to identify specifically 
what interpretation error was made and by whom. Therefore, the Board could not have provided 
any meaningful "interpretation." Poll's appeal further suggests that there is some violation by the 
developer and a related but unresolved dispute among a number of parties. While these 
questions might properly be explored with the city council or other city officials, the developer's 
alleged failure to comply with the ordinance simply would not amount to an affirmative 
"decision" by the City from which to appeal. 
The issues raised in this section are essentially requests for advisory opinions. 
Concerning advisory opinions, the Utah Supreme Court stated, "[t]he appellate court will not 
issue advisory opinions or examine a controversy that has not yet sharpened into an actual or 
imminent clash of legal rights and obligations between the parties thereto. Where there exists no 
more than a difference of opinion regarding the hypothetical application of a piece of legislation 
18 
to a situation in which the parties might, at some future time, find themselves, the question is 
unripe for adjudication." Houghton v. Dep't of Health, 125 P.3d 860, 868 (Utah 2005) (quoting 
State v. Ortiz, 987 P.2d 39 (Utah 1999)). See also Summit Water Distrib. Co. v. Summit 
County, 123 P.3d 437, 452 (Utah 2005) ("Our settled policy is to avoid giving advisory opinions 
in regard to issues unnecessary to the resolution of the claims before us"). While the Board is not 
a court of law, it is nevertheless a quasi-judicial body, and the same rationale for avoiding 
advisory opinions should apply. 
Finally, it appears under this section that Poll is alleging that the Sensitive Land 
Ordinance requires that the city hire an independent consultant and that the city erroneously 
failed to do so. However, while the ordinance permits the hiring of an independent consultant, it 
does not require it, and as argued throughout this memorandum, only affirmative decisions, not 
alleged failures to act, may be appealed to the Board. 
The district court correctly concluded that "there is nothing in the Act or city ordinances 
that requires or permits the Board to provide advisory opinions." (Record at 410). 
B. Discussion of individual issues appealed to this court under original case number 
050700250. Although a number of amendments were made to the Municipal Land Use, 
Development, and Management Act in 2005, those amendments did not become effective until 
May 2, 2005. Former U.C.A. §10-9-704 therefore applies to this petition for review because the 
appeal was heard on March 29, 2005. Utah Code Ann. §10-9-704, limits appeals to the board of 
adjustment to persons adversely affected by a decision administering or interpreting a zoning 
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ordinance,3 and the elements of a proper appeal to the Board under this Section are: "(1) a person 
adversely affected, (2) a decision administering or interpreting a zoning ordinance, (3) a decision 
applying the zoning ordinance, and (4) an error in the decision administering or interpreting the 
zoning ordinance." Busche v. Salt Lake County, 26 P.3d at 867 . 
1. Subdivision plat issues. In his petition, Poll argues that the Board's decision was 
not responsive to the issue he raised. In his petition, Poll specifically states that he "challenged 
the Mayor's failure to require the subdivider to either stay within the drawn-to-scale boundaries 
of the approved p la t . . . or to require the subdivider to vacate the approved plat and create a new 
one.. ." While the Board determined that Poll was not an "aggrieved" or "adversely affected 
party," there are several additional reasons why this issue is not within the scope of the Board's 
authority. First, there is no "decision" appealed from. Poll is complaining about alleged 
violations of ordinances and/or failures to act rather than responding to an affirmative order, 
requirement, decision or determination. Because there is no decision, there is no accompanying 
administration, interpretation, and application of a zoning ordinance from which to appeal. 
Second, U.C.A. §10-9-704 permits appeals from decisions administering or interpreting a 
"zoning ordinance." The issues raised involve the subdivision ordinance, not the zoning 
ordinance. Third, the Board has no authority to compel the mayor to take action against a 
developer. 
The district court correctly concluded that "the Board did not have authority to resolve 
this issue because it does not involve a decision administering or interpreting a zoning ordinance 
See U.C.A. §10-9-704, footnote 2, supra. 
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as required under former Section 10-9-704 of the Utah Code." (Record at 409). 
2. Vinyl Fence. This issue has become moot. Mr. Poll and the City have 
apparently reached an agreement concerning the fence at issue. 
This issue would not fall within the jurisdiction of the Board anyway "because it does not 
involve a decision administering or interpreting a zoning ordinance as required under former 
Section 10-9-704 of the Utah Code. Rather, it involves an alleged failure to enforce the 
subdivision ordinance." (Record at 409). Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that 
the Board has no authority to resolve this issue. (Id.) 
3. Construction of the road. This issue is moot. This appears to be an allegation by 
Poll that an unapproved road was constructed by the developer in connection with a subdivision. 
Neither the city nor the developer claims that the area in question was anything more than a 
construction access; nobody intended for it to be a road, and in fact there is no road. The district 
court correctly determined that this issue "has been rendered moot at this point because no such 
road has been constructed." (Record at 409). Further, in this instance, as with others, there was 
no order, requirement, decision or determination made by an administrative official, nor was 
there a decision administering or interpreting a zoning ordinance. 
4. Easements on 1375 East. This issue is moot. Like the previous two issues, this 
issue is also now moot. In fact, Judge Memmott is the judge who has already decided this issue 
in a separate law suit brought by Mr. Poll in the district court (Record at 29, 49-50). 
In this case it appears that Mr. Poll is alleging that the mayor, city manager, and city 
attorney improperly offered opinions concerning the necessity of obtaining easements on 1375 
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East, and in fact Poll accuses the mayor and city manager of outright criminal conduct. It also 
appears that he is alleging that the decision of the planning commission and/or city council to 
approve the Byram Subdivision was somehow improper because it was influenced by those 
opinions (Record at 11-15). Frankly, the appeal amounts to a convoluted medley of grievances, 
accusations, and subjective legal assumptions. Vagueness and lack of specificity alone should be 
sufficient grounds to deny further review of this item. Moreover, the only decision that was 
made was the decision to approve the subdivision in accordance with the subdivision ordinance. 
There was no requirement, decision, or determination made by an administrative official, nor was 
there a decision administering or interpreting a zoning ordinance. Essentially, Poll is asking the 
Board to resolve a dispute concerning ownership or right of use of 1375 East. This would be 
well beyond the jurisdiction of the Board. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the appellee asks this Court to affirm the district court's order 
dismissing Brent Poll's Petitions for Review for lack of jurisdiction. 
DATED this ^ / day of May, 2007. 
Attorney for Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the 7/ day of May, 2007,1 caused to be mailed, by U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid, two accurate copies of this BRIEF OF APPELLEE to Brent Poll, 7605 South 1376 
East, South Weber, Utah 84405. 
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Addendum 
Utah Code Ann. §10-9a-103 
As used in this chapter: 
(2) "Appeal authority" means the person, board, commission, agency, or other body designated 
by ordinance to decide an appeal of a decision of a land use application or a variance. 
(13) "Land use application" means an application required by a municipality's land use ordinance. 
(14) "Land use authority" means a person, board, commission, agency, or other body designated 
by the local legislative body to act upon a land use application. 
Utah Code Ann. §10-9a-701 
(1) Each municipality adopting a land use ordinance shall, by ordinance, establish one or more 
appeal authorities to hear and decide: 
(a) requests for variances from the terms of the land use ordinances; and 
(b) appeals from decisions applying the land use ordinances. 
(2) As a condition precedent to judicial review, each adversely affected person shall timely and 
specifically challenge a land use authority's decision, in accordance with local ordinance. 
Utah Code Ann. §10-9a-703 
The applicant, a board or officer of the municipality, or any person adversely affected by the land 
use authority's decision administering or interpreting a land use ordinance may, within the time 
period provided by ordinance, appeal that decision to the appeal authority by alleging that there is 
error in any order, requirement, decision, or determination made by the land use authority in the 
administration or interpretation of the land use ordinance. 
Utah Code Ann. §10-9a-707 
(4) Only those decisions in which a land use authority has applied a land use ordinance to a 
particular application, person, or parcel may be appealed to an appeal authority. 
South Weber City Ordinance 10-4-4 
POWERS OF THE BOARD: The Board of Adjustment shall have the following powers: 
A. Appeals: To hear and decide appeals where it is alleged that there is error in any order, 
requirement, decision or determination made by the administrative official and the enforcement 
of any of the planning or zoning provisions of the ordinances of the City. 
